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lliunicipal 28 Cal.2d 460, 464 [171 P.2c1 8].) [2] It 
seems obvious that the refusal of the judge to rule on the 
effect of the order for allowance and his action in 
transferring the proceeding to the master calendar 
department for and trial did not constitute a decision 
on the of res [3] While res judicata may 
be a the court in 
which the case is to pass upon the 
question of whether or not the is well taken. (Reidy v. 
Cotrrt, 220 Cal. 112 [29 P.2d 780] ; Baird v. 
Superior 204 Cal. 412-414 [268 P. 640] ; Liberty 
Mnt. Ins. Co. v. 62 Cal.App.2d 601, 610-611 
[145 P.2d 344]; Ooodman Bros., Inc. v. Court, 51 
Cal.App.2d 297, 304-~i06 [124 P.2d 644]; see Vitimin Milling 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 116, 121 [33 P.2d 1016]; 
cf. Donovan v. Superior Cm1rt, 39 Cal.2d 848, 851 [250 P.2d 
246].) Accordingly, application for the writ is premature. 
'rhe alternative writ of prohibition is discharged and the 
peremptory writ is denied. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., 'rraynor, .J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
[Sac. No. 6530. In Bank. July 5, 1955.] 
HARRY C. STEINMETZ, Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA 
S'rATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Public Employees-Construction of Statute.-Words "knowing 
membership," as used in Gov. Code, § 1028.1, relating to duty 
of public employee to appear before investigating body or com-
mittee and answer as to his in Com-
munist Party or any organization advocating violent overthrow 
of government, refer to person's knowledge of his membership 
rather than to his knowledge of character of organization. 
[2] !d.-Application of Statute.-Under Gov. Corle, § 1028.1, subd. 
(d), relating to duty of public employee to appear before in-
vestigating body or committee and answer questions as to his 
present knowing nwmbership in Communist Party or as to his 
past knowing mPmbership in such party at any time smce 
[1] See Cal.Jur.Supp. (1951-1955), Public Employees,§ 4. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 7, 8, 13, 14] Public Employees, § 4; 
[ 4-6] Public Employees, § 5; [9, 11, 12] Public Employees § 6; [10] 
Witnesses, § 18. 
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September 10, 1948, it is proper to question such employee as 
to fact of membership without reference to his knowledge of 
character of organization, and questions on this point which 
hP refuses to answer are not coYered by his denials that he was 
knowingly a member with knowledge of nature of party. 
!d.-Validity of Statute.--Gov. Code,§ to duty 
of to appear before 
connnittce and answer is not inYRlid 
such to answer questions as to his member-
without regard to his knowledge of 
nature of party. 
!d.-Regulations-Loyalty and Fitness.-A governmental body 
may make reasonable inquiries into matters pertaining to fit-
ness of its employees. 
[5] !d.-Regulations-Loyalty and Fitness.-Loyalty on part of 
of those in public employment is important to orderly and de-
pcwlahlc governnwnt and is, therefore, relevant to fitness for 
such employment. 
[6] !d.-Regulations-Loyalty and Fitness.-An employee's asso-
ciates, as well as his conduct, are factors which may be con-
sidered by state agency in determining his loyalty, and in-
formation on that subject may properly be elicited from him. 
[7] !d.-Construction of Statute.-Under statutes which provide 
for or disqualification of public employee because 
of membership in proscribed organizations or refusal to take 
oath membership, knowledge of character of organiza-
tions is essential, and legislation is sustaincd only when it 
or impliedly requires such knowledge. 
[8] !d.-Construction of Statute.--Where statutes provide merely 
for disclosuTe of information concerning public employee's 
membership in proscribed organizations, requirr~ment that em-
ployee have knowledge of nature of organization is not neces-
sary. 
[9] Id.-Duty to Answer Questions.-Where public employee's re-
fusal to answer questions asked him by governmental body as 
to his past or present membership in Communist Party was 
not based on claim of privilege against self-incrimination 
under U.S. Const., 5th Amendment, or Cal. Const., art. I, ~ 13, 
he is precluded from relying on these constitutional provisions 
in n proceeding to compel ltis rein::tatcmrnt. 
[10] Witnesses-Duty to Testify--Self-incrimination-Waiver of 
Privilege.-A witness is required to claim privilege against 
self-incrimination, which is personal privilege solely for his 
benefit, and it is deemed waived unless ilwoked. 
[11] Public Employees-Duty to Disclose Information.-A person 
[10] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 21; Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 79, 84 
et seq. 
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may properly be required to disclose information relevant to 
fitness and loyalty as reasonable condition for obtaining or 
retaining public employment, though such disclosure, under 
some circumstances, may amount to self-incrimination. 
[12] Id.-Duty to Disclose Information.-A public employee cannot 
be forced to give answer which may tend to incriminate him, 
but he may be required to choose between disclosing informa-
tion and losing his employment. 
[13] !d.-Validity of Statute.-Gov. Code, § 1028.1, relating to 
duty of public employee to appear before investigating body 
or committee and answer questions, does not violate constitu-
tional provision prohibiting passage of specials laws in certain 
enumerated cases and "in all other cases where a general law 
can be made applicable" ( Const., art. IV, § 25, subds. 1-33), 
since such section does not fall within any of enumerated 
categories, and, insofar as any of its provisions are specific, 
no general law could have been made applicable. 
[14] !d.-Validity of Statute.-Legislature, desiring to authorize 
inquiry as to public employee's membership in Communist 
Party, can do so only by naming it, and designation of such 
organization in Gov. Code, § 1028.1, is not arbitrary but is 
reasonably related to purpose of legislation, since information 
as to membership in such party is pertinent to fitness for 
public employment. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel petitioner's rein-
statement as associate professor at a state college. "\Vrit 
denied. 
Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand 
for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard L. 
Mayers, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Petitioner was dismissed from his posi-
tion as an associate professor at San Diego State College 
because of his refusal, at a hearing before the State Board 
of JiJducation, to answer two questions as to whether he was 
or had been a member of the Communist Party, and he seeks 
a writ of mandate to compel his reinstatement. 
The state board acted pursuant to section 1028.1 of the 
Government Code, which is part of a statute commonly known 
as the Luckel Act. Section 1028.1 provides that it shall be 
the duty of any public employee, when ordered to do so, 
to appear before the governing body of the state or local 
agency by which he is employed and to answer under oath 
questions relating to: 
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'· ) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the 
forceful o1· violent overthrow of the Gowrnment of the United 
States or of any state. 
"(b) Present lmmdng membership in any organization 
uow advocating the forceful or violent overthrow of the 
Government of the United States or of any state. 
" Past kno'IYing membership at any time since Sep-
tc~mbcr 10, 1948, in any organization whieh, to the knowledge 
of such employee, during the time of the employee's member-
ship advocated the forceful or violent overthrow of the 
Goyermnent of the United States or of any state. 
" (d) Questions as to present kno1ving· membership of such 
<·mployee in the Communist Party or as to past knmving 
membership in the Communist Party at any time sinct-
September 10, 1948.'' 
The seetion further provides that ''.Any employee who fails 
or refuses to appear or to answer under oath on any ground 
whatsoeYer any such questions so propounded shall be guilty 
of insubordination and guilty of violating this section and 
shall be suspended and dismissed from his employment in 
the manner provided by law." 
At the hearing petitioner was examined by \Villiam Blair, 
president of the State Board of Edncatiou, as follows: 
Mn. BLAm : . . . Are you knowingly a member of the 
Communist Party'? 
Dn. STEI:'\liiE'rz: 1\Ir. Chairman. I am sorry, but I find 
it neeessary to refuse to answer t1Jis question as I would if 
yon asked me if I were a member of any other party because 
[ do not believe that there is authority in the act under which 
yon are proceecling for asking such a question. 
MR. BLAIR: ... HaYe you at any time since September 
J 0, 1948, knowingly be<cn a member of the Communist Party? 
DR. STEINliiE1'Z: In all good conscience I must give you 
exactly the same answer now that I gaye you a moment 
ago, sir. 
NiR. BLAIR: That is, that you decline to answer. 
DR. STEINliiETZ: Yes, sir. 
JYIR. BLAIR: ... Do you know whether or not the Com-
muni.~t Party advocates the forceful or violent overthrow of 
t h(~ p:overnment of the United States or of any state? 
DR. STEINllfETZ: Mr. Blair, I have no such knowledge. 
lYIR. BLAIR: Have you at any time since September 10, 
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1948, to and including today, knowingly been a member of 
the Communist Party when, to your knowledge, it advocated 
the forceful or violent overthrow of the government of the 
United States or of any state 7 
DR. STEINMETZ: Mr. Blair. I have in part answered 
this question when I disclaimed knowledge. I should like 
further to answer it by saying that I have never in my life, 
now, in the past, and so long as I would be a state employee, 
'vould never belong to an organization that advocated force 
and violence against the United States, this state, or any 
snbdiYision thereof. I took an oath, the Levering Act oath, 
and signed it honestly, ... [Here petitioner recited in sub-
the Levering oath, Gov. Code, § 3103.] 
lVIR. BLAIR: That was intended to be an answer to the 
question "Have you at any time since September 10, 1948, to 
and including today, knmvingly been a member of the Com-
munist Party when to your knowledge it advocated the forceful 
or violent overthrow of the government of the United States 
or of any state?'' ·what would be your answer directly to 
that question, Dr. StEinmetz? 
DR. STEINJ\IETZ: Mr. Blair, in part I answered that when 
I c1iselaimed knowledge, and in further part I have just 
answered it by reaffirming the r~evering Act oath. 
MR. BLAIR: I have repeated the question and I would 
feel obliged to direct you to answer it "yes" or "no" or "I 
refuse to answer." After that you may explain your answer, 
if you have not already explained it. 
DR.. STEINJVIE'rz : May I say that I have answered a 
question ·with regard to membership by saying that I would 
not ans·wer any question with regard to membership, and 
that \vas very straightfonyard, and I have answered a ques-
tion 'vith regard to knowledge by disclaiming that I had the 
knowledge, and I have answel·cd a question with regard to 
advocacy with an emphutic "No." 
MR. BLAIR: Your ''no'' applies to what part of the ques-
tion? 
DR. STEINMETZ: To my advocacy, and to my knowledge, 
and to membership 'vith knowledge. 
MR. BLAIR: 'l'hese questions were all framed in the belief 
that they could be in all fairness answered "yes" or "no." 
DR. STEI~METZ: You consider a question like that fair, 
1\Ir. Blair? 
MR. BLAIR: It seems that it simply wishes to inquire 
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whether you have knowingly been a member of the Com-
munist Party when to your it advocated the 
forceful and Yiolent oyerthrow of the government. Now 
ean you ansvYer that by-you can answer that by "yes" or 
"no" or by refusal to answer it. If you take objection to 
the form of it yon can refnse to ;cms1ver. 
DR. STEINMETZ: Under in principle on account 
of rny belief 1vith my that this is a ques-
tion, pressed as l feel I am, I answer it then ''no.'' 
MR. BLAIR: . . Do you advocate the forceful 
or Yiolcut ovcrthro\v of the of the l~nited States 
or of the government of any state of the United States? 
DR. STEINMETZ: Mr. Blair, as a teacher and a free 
American, I trnst, who between incitement and 
, I like no to but I 
have already ans1vered it "no," and therefore, of course, 
answer it the same way now. 
MR. BLAIR: ... Are you knowingly a member of any 
organization whicb to your knowledge now adYocates the 
forceful or violent overthrow of the goyernment of the United 
States or of the government of any state of the United States? 
DR. STEINMETZ: No, sir .... 
l\1R. BLAIR: Have you at any time since September 10, 
1948, knowingly been a member of any organization which 
to your then knowledge adyocated the time of your 
membership the forceful or violent overthrow of the govern-
ment of the United States or of the government of any state 
of the United States? 
DR. STEINMETZ: ... I should like to answer the last ques-
tion with a very decided "no." 
The foregoing shows that, although petitioner answered 
questions asked under subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of 
section 1028.1 relating to his advocacy of violent 
overthrow of the government and his membership in organi-
zations advocating violent overthrow of the government, he 
refused to answer two questions asked under subdivision 
(d), namely, (1) "Are you knowingly a member of the Com-
munist Party?" and (2) "Have you at any time since Sep-
tember 10, 1948, knowingly been a member of the Communist 
Party?'' His disc-harge was based upon this refusal. 
Petitioner argues that, in effect, he answered the ques-
tions as to whether he was knowingly a member of the Com-
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munist Party when, at a later point in the examination, he 
replied to the inquiry as to knowing membership in the party 
with knowledge of its objectives. However, he refused to 
answer inquiries which omitted the qualification of knowledge 
of the nature of the and were directed only to 
'rhe word ''knowingly'' as used 
which he declined to answer did not refer 
of the aims of the party but merely to whether 
he knew that he was a member, and it is clear from the record 
that he so understood the word at the time he refused to 
answer. In a memorandum submitted to the board at the 
of the hearing, stated, "The use of the 
'knowing membership in the Communist Party' does 
not vitiate the vice of the statute. 'rhis is so because the 
has made it elear that the 'knowing' refers to 
knowiug one is a member of the Party rather than as to the 
knowledge of the oue being questioned as to the subversive 
nature of tile Party .... In other words, the statute plainly 
states that knmvledge of the improper nature of the Com-
munist Party is not an ingredient.'' Petitioner also showed 
that he so unclerstood the questions when he said, "I have 
answered a question with regard to membership by saying 
that I would not ans·wer any question with regard to mem-
bership ... and I answered a question with regard to 
knmvledge by diselaiming that I had the knowledge .... '' 
[1] Seetion 1028.1, eonsic1er(•d as a vYholr, shows on its 
facr that the Legislature, in using the words "knowing mem-
bership,'' was referring to a person's knowledge of his 
membership, rather than to his knowledge of the character 
of the organization. In sn bdiYision (e), when the Legislature 
intended to specify knowledge of the nature of the organi-
zation, as ·well as lmowlectge of the faet of membership, it 
expl!crtly re.lerred to "knmving membership" in an organiza-
tion vYhich "to the knowledge of sueh employee ... advo-
cated'' violent overthrow of the government. In the next 
subdivision, on the other hand, when the Legislature spoke 
of "knowing membership" without mention of knowledge of 
advoeaey, it obviously was referring only to the fact of mem-
bership and not to knowledge of the nature of the organiza-
tion. 'l'he choice of language was elearly deliberate, and in 
both subdivisions the words "knowing membership" were 
used in the same sense of knowledge of the faet of membership. 
[2] It thus was proper, under the terms of subdivision (d), 
to question petitioner as to the fact of membership without 
reference to hi,; knowlPllge of the charaeter of the organiza-
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and the qnestious on this which he refused to 
answer not covered by his denials that he was lnlO'Wiugly 
a membi·r with lmowledge o.f the llatm·e of the party. 
The statute under vdrich \\·as dismissed is 
inntlid by the fact that it requires an employee 
to answer q ncstious as to his in the Communist 
Party "IYitJwut regard to his of the nature of the 
111 
was not because of membership 
but because of his refu:sal to 
Hot he held membership 
m the may, 
matters pertaining 
to the fltlJC'''" of its on the part of 
those in pnblic to orderly and de-
pendable ~·overJJment aml is, thercfort', relenmt to fitness 
for such employment. (J>ockm.an Y. Leonard, 39 Ca1.2d 676, 
687 P.2rl 267] .) [6] }tiJ 's associates, as well 
as his eonclnet, are faetors which may be considered by a state 
ageney i•1 determining his loyalty, and information on that 
sub;jeet may properly be elicited from him. (Adler v. Boarcl 
of Educaiion, 342 TJ.S. 483, 492-493 [72 S.Ct. 380, 96 J.J.Ed. 
517, 27 A.hH. 472] ; Poclcrnan v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 
686-687 [249 P.2d 267) .) 1 In this connection, it has been held 
that a public employer may comtitntioua1ly require its em-
ployees to disclose any past or present membership in the 
Communist Party. (Garne1· v. Board of Public Works, 341 
U.S. 716, 720 [71 S.Ct. 909, 9f5 IJ.Ed. 1317].) 2 
[7] Statutes, snch as the one im·olvccl here, IYhich compel 
diselosure of information eoncerning a public employee's 
'Iu the Adler rase it was said: "Oue's assoeiatcs, past und present, 
as well as one's conduct, may properly he considered in determining 
fitness and loynlty. l<'rom time immemorial, one's reputation has been 
dPtermined in part by the compuny he keeps. In the employment of 
officials ::md teachers of the school system, the state may very properly 
inquire into tho eompany they keep, and we know of no rule, constitu-
tionul or otherwise, that preYents the state, when determining the 
fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the organizations 
and peroons with whom they associate.'' 
2 In the Garner case, after stating that the issue was 1vhether a city 
''is constitutionally forbiddrm to rCfJUire that its employees disclose 
their past or present membership in the Communist Party,'' it was said: 
''lYe think thnt a municipal employer is not disabled lweause it is an 
agency of tl1o State from inqniring of its employees us to matters that 
may proYo relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service. 
Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty m:q have a 
reasonuble relutionship to present and future trust. Both are commonly 
inquired into in determining :fitness for both high and low positions in 
priYato industry and are not less relevant in public employment.'' 
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membership in proscribed organizations, must be distinguished 
from those \vhich provide for discharge or disqualification 
because of membership or refusal to take an oath denying 
membership. Under the latter type of statute, knowledge of 
the character of the organizations has been held essential 
(Wieman v. 344 U.S. 183 [73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 
216] ), and the legislation has been sustained when it 
expressly or impliedly such v. 
Boar·cl 842 U.S. 494 [72 S.Ct. 96 
hEd. 517, 27 A.I1.R.2d 472] ; Garnet· v. Board Public 
n-arks, 3'11 U.S. 7H!, 723-724 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317] ; 
Gerencle v. Baltimore City Board of Elections, 
341 U.S. 57 [71 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. 745] ; Packman v. 
39 Cal.2d 676, 685 P.2d 267] ; Hirschman v. 
County of Los 39 Cal.2d 698, 702 [249 P.2d 287, 
250 P.2d 145] ). [8] On the other hand, where the statutes 
provide merely for the disclosure of information, a require-
ment that the employee have knowledge of the nature of the 
is not necessary. Garner v. Board of 
Public W arks, 341 U.S. 716, 719-720 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 
1317] ; Adler v. Bom·cl of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492-493 
[72 S.Ct. 880, 27 .A.L.R.2d 472] .) 
[9] Petitioner's refusal to answer was not basecl upon · 
a claim of privilege against self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution or section 13 
of article I of the state and, aceordingly, he 
is precluded from relying on these constitutional provisions. 
[10] It is settled that a IYitness is required to claim this 
privilege, that it is a purely personal privilege, for 
the benefit of the witness and that it is deemed \Yah·ed unless 
invoked. (Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 870-371 
[71 S.Ct. 438, 95 hEd. 19 A.Lll.2d ) [11] More-
over, a person may properly be required to diselose informa-
tion relevant to fitness and loyalty as a reasonable eondition 
for obtaining or retaining public employment, even though 
the disclosure, under some circumstanees, may amount to self-
inenmmation. (Packman v. Leonard, 39 Ca1.2d 676, 687 
[249 P.2d 267] ; Christal v. Police Corn., 33 Cal.App.2d 564, 
567 et seq. [ 92 P .2d 4161 ; cf. Garner v. Boar·cl of Public 
W arks, 341 U.S. 7J 6, 719-720 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1817] ; 
.Adler v. Board of Education, 842 U.S. 485, 492-493 [72 
S.Ct. 380, 96 hEel. 517, 27 A.LR.2d 472] .) [12] A public 
employee, of course, cannot be forced to give an answer which 
may tend to incriminate him, but he may be required to 
., ,T., 
of the 
EDUCATION [ 44 0.2d 
the Supreme 
Steinmetz was wrongfully discharged 
cmtitled to reinstated. This conclusion 
may be reached either of two lines of reasoning: (1) That 
Dr. Steinmetz all of the asked of him 
the anu therefore did not violate the provisions of 
section 1028.1; or, (2) that Dr. Steinmetz 
of the put to him, but the 
board had no to ask those questions because the 
statute under ·which acted was unconstitutional. (Wie-
or 
of due process, 
in the 
344 U.S. [73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216] ; 
39 Oal.2d 676 [249 P.2c1 267]; Hirsch-
of Los 39 Cal.2c1 698 [249 P.2c1 287, 
) 
the majority decision in this 
's trident. The central point 
of the constitutionally 
against oneself. The two 
are : , there was no violation of 
that the statute is an arbitrary deprivation 
and unconstitutional under the 
In 
reaching its erroneous eonelusion the majority has necessarily 
impaled itself on one or more of these points. 
The first contention made Dr. Steinmetz in his petition 
for a writ of mandate is that he did not violate Government 
Code, section and that his discharge for an alleged 
violation of that section was therefore unlawful. No conten-
tion is made that Dr. Steinmetz refused to answer any of 
the to him these two: 
(1) "Are yon member of the Communist 
Party " 
''Have yon at any time since September 10, 1948, 
knowingly brrn a member of the Communist Party~'' 
July 1 
The rrrord shows 
when asked: 
1948, to and 
the Communist 
the forceful or violent 
United States?" 
Dr. Steinmetz contends 
constituted au answer to 1 he 
It is clear either that the 
did constitute an 
the majority 
or that the State Boanl of Education 
ask the two former because 
those questions is nncomtitntiona1. 
snzn·a, 344 U.S. 183; Pocknw.n v. 
676; II irschman v. Los 
698.) 
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The controversy ce11tcrs around the of the word 
"knowingly" as used in the statute 
questions asked of Dr. Steillluetz. 'l'lw opinion 
states that the word ' , '' as used in the 
which Dr. Steinmetz refused to answer, " 
did not refer to knowledge of the aims of the but 
to whether he knew that he was a member .... " 
Dr. Steinmetz contends that the " " re-
ferred to lmowledge of the nature of the Communist 
Party, and that he did, answer the negative) the 
question as to membership in the with of its 
nature. 
.S. the Supreme 
u unanimous held 
that the due process clause of the Constitution of the United 
States was violated by io the membership of 
state employees in certain nnlcss such 
r"cfcrTecl to membership with of the activities an(l 
purposes of the organizations to which the belonged. 
Classification of innocent membership with member-
ship was held to be arbitrary, nnreasonablr~ and lmCollstitu-
tional. 
Conversely, 
(though not unanimously) tlmt 
an employee in the Communist 
organizations, is permissible where 
inquiry is as to membership with 
Court has held 
as to membership of 
, or in named subversive 
or assumedly the 























830 STEI'\;1rETZ v. CAr". STATE BoARD OF' EDUCATION [ 44 C.2d 
P.2d 2671, dissenting opin-
SP(:tion meets an even 
than did the loyalty oath 
statute consi,lered h1 the Poekman emw. \Vithout passing upon 
the b~,hind Government Code, 
tion 
this sedion is clearly a legisla-
of the I<lifth Amendment 
States and of article I, sec-
of California. The section makes of 
the seeond-class ei! izen by denying to him, 
exelnsion from his means of livelihood, the 
refnse to whid1 might tend to in-
eriminate him--a to l'YCI'J citizen by the 
Constitutions of the United States and of California. 
ln the court counsel for Dr. Stein-
metz against self-inerimina-
Pifth Amendment argument 
Dr. Steinmetz's answers 
incriminating, he was entitled 
on the l<lifth Amendment, and its 
California . to avoid a trap for perjury 
set those with suft1cient influence to have him summoned . 
. . " That he did invoke that privilege at the hearing, is 
sho1vn in the of his t0stimony which is quoted 
later in this 
Th0 Ji'ifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States in that "No per;;;on ... shall be com-
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
be of l property, withont due 
pelled, in 
nor be 
process of law; '' 
This amendment \Yas adoptrcl in 1791. 
our Constitution provides 
that "No person shall ... be com-
case, be a witness against himself; 
liberty, or property without due 
'l'he proper of thrse constitutional provisions 
to a modern enactment can best be understood b~' 
them in the baekgronnd of their historical develop-
ment. in about tlw year 1236 A.D. in England, 
there were ecclesiastical courts which took upon themselves 
mueh of the burden of various <lisputes. It was the 
of these courts to snbmit persons called before them 
to an "oath ex officio." If the persons summoned to appear 
did not do so, were excommunicated; if they did appear 
were foreed to 
the private sins of 
sc;hooled in the common 
person to furnish his own 
oath, was to 
accused began to 
man on trial could not 
would disclose his 
absolute. 'When a 
to identify himself 
pressly admitting that he was 
was asked how he would 
penalty depended upon the 
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he was charged. H treason or a he ~was treated 
as if he had pleaded if a 
prison with a meager allowance of bread and water. Later, 
in addition to the bread and 1vater 
to torture, which either killed him or indm~ed him within a 
period of an hour or so, to plead either or not guilty. 
'fhis horrible and barbaric praetiee was not discontinued until 
1772. At that time a statnte was em1cted which provided 
that if a person stood mute on his of piracy or 
felony, he should be convictrd and the conrt should award 
judgment and rxecution as if he had bePn eonvictrd verdict 
or confession. In 1827, hovvcver, mnte in any crimi-
nal case was by statute (7 & 8 made the 
of a plea of not guilty. 
'fhis, then, was the background 1n which led our 
forefathers to the firm conviction that no man should be 
compelled to testify against himse1f. 
If one is asked questions abont tlw way 
of looking at his refusal to ans',n'r Js that he must 
know something about it or rlse would hr rrfuse to 
answer? In other words. it is saicl that the refusal to answer 
g·ives rise to an infrrence of' of But the 
only thing which is sure is that the witnrss l1as rrfnsecl to 
answer. There are no less than three inf('rences vYhich may 
be drawn from such a rrfusal to : ( 1) 'l'bat the witness 
is guilty; (2) that he knows or some which 
might tend to incriminate him: and ( 3) that he refusrc1 to 
answer because he frrls that the has no or 
business, to ask him such If we go back to the 
common law as it finally developed, we find that standing 





11ot \I'<Ult them to be ie ;•eJJsnre 'rhid1 
he bas elltOUJJtere<1 because of ealle(\ before an in-
If he told all t lwt lw \ronld be ng to 
lw \Hlttl(l haY(' 1mi\·e<1 the claim of tho 
aJH1 conlcl not rpfm;e to other 
his friends. It ma,r aho lw tnw ihat th<' 
witness lms 110 fin;t-haml of the Cowmm1ist Party 
or of any olller whir·b are of he 
tlwt be has IH'\'Cl' auy organizations of an,,- i.nw. 
that he is a loyal American wllo believes that the 
recent rash of scenrity iHY\'SLigat ions, Joyaltr ~nspieion 
awl di:.;tnt8t has tlw bou of iJH1iYidna1 
librrty and pel'sonal estab!i;.;hed b,,- i he framers of 
our state and natiollal Constitutions. B'rom liis :stw1irs of 
Fnitrd States and of the C'onstitlli he knows that 
the goV<'l'llment has 110 right to inrjltire into his e beliefs 
and as:soeiai icms Hllll'ss lltr)' eonstitute a t·lPar a]](1 
danger to thn of the \Ylt ic~l1 his beliefs and 
assoriatiuns obYions1~- l1o not. fip kuows th<:t his to 
freedom of tho11gllt, religion and ma;- Hot 
be abridged by thn Congress or by ihe :stah· Legislature. lin 
knows tbat be may uot arbitraril.\' be of li k liberty 
or propert~'. He feels that the inwstigntion in 1Yhid1 hl• is 
inyoh-ed is not in areord with the spi 1·it Yrll ieh permrates 
tlte Constit utioll, Hml that to mrekl:· state his imwceHec: would 
be, in effect, c~oopl•rating ·with those who ~would or 
impair tile cJredinw•ss of 1he ConstitnLion atHl the Bill of 
HightN. He al;.;o, that if he. an innocent 
person, opposes this inYae>ion into his libcri the wwon-
stitlllion:1l natnn• of the inwsti~;ation and of the antlwrity 
H]J(1er which is eon<lude(l \\'ill br forecfully brought home 





United States Constitution. 
, there a 
members of the 
invokes constitutional 
disloyal, or is 
process 
I<'onrteenth Amemhnent to the 
of many un-
that a witness who 
to testify is 
were to uncover. '"l'here can be no 
consequences visited upon a person excluded from 
In the view of the com-
has become a badge 
in time of cold and hot 
emotions when 'each man to eye his as a 
possible enemy.' ... To thus inhibit indiYidual freedom of 
movement is to stifle the fio,v of demoeratic and 
at one of its chief sources. . . . '' (IV icman v. 
Updegraff, supra, 344 U.S. ) I belieYe that two state-
ments made under oath Dr. Steinmetz at the same hearing 
where he purportedly refused to answPr two of the questions 
of the investigating board should those who read this 
opinion to determine whether Dr. Steinmetz is or is not a 
loyal and he at first refused to answer the dis-
puted 
Dr. Steinmetz first stated under oath: " ... I should like 
publicly to reaffirm that I will support and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States and the Constitution of the 
State of California against all foreign and domestic; 







with sufficient influence to 






even if the 
set by those 
him summoned in the first 
"Now, ladies and I believe that no legislation 
is valid that incorporates such a attempt to cir-
cumvent the Constitution. Behavior allowed by the U. S. 
Constituiion cannot by a state on the 
grounds that it is when the be-
havior is duties of a subordi-
nate .... 
''. . . I have been summoned to interrogation of a judicial 
type because I am a public educator but not for anything that 
I have done as either an educator or a public employee. 
Indeed, there being no charge me the situation is 
utterly paradoxical, so it should not be advantage if 
I were to demand or attempt an explanation. However, since 
you find none necessary I find it sufficient at the moment 
simply to point out this fact .... I am sure that all of you 
members believe in a government of law and not of men, 
and a with a clear separation of powers as pro-
vided by the and I am sure you have probably 
sworn au oath necessitating such convictions. You must then 
recognize that the assumption or of judicial powers 
by or to a legislative committee, or executive agency, or policy 
commission such as yours is unconstitutional and, if I may 
add, I think in my opinion subversive to the Bill of Rights. 
''The California Legislature has mistakenly authorized you 
to ask questions that are accusing in effect especially when 
directed to an individual; questions permitting of but one 
answer such as usually characterized police state questions; 
questions that as in my case are totally unnecessary if they 
are legal because their proper answer is already known so 
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me. 
[14 C.2d 316; 285 P.2d 6171 
; ques-
been answered and questions which 
to rather than 
no motive 
new law. 
so much as 
from the standpoint 
with a profound 
viewpoint is less 
the descendant of 
a free press, an instructive 
and and every other manifestation 
of cnlt uee in America. these of vaunted political 
for freedom in the \V estern \Vorld I contend that 
arc jeopardized by 
its sacrifice. summoned for public 
humiliation awl told th0 act nm1rr which you are proceed-
that I cannot use the Bill of to avoid jeopardy 
enemirs then no man is safe from those in 
power, indeed then no secret will be safe and 
may cease to be temporary and become totali-
citizen ean find satisfaetion in 
or private, who ean hold 
him un(1er eonstant threat for politieal dissent. Publie em-
ceases to be either right or privilege or duty an 
under such cireumstances. . . . [I] t is really the 
~"''"'n'""Q of the law that threatens. And I oppose 
and shall eontirme to oppose it if it is 
Court passes upon it .... " 
Ont> nmst be im1c>c>d naive if he cannot see the parallel 
between Hw of Dr. Steinmetz before this investigat-
boarc1. witness ealled before the ecclesiastical 
eourt or Star in England in the 15th, 16th or 17th 
centuries. The very evils which prompted an early Congress 
to add to our Constitution the proteetion of the Bill of 


